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APPLICATION OF PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE UNDER WISCONSIN FRAUD
AND WARRANTY CASES
By IRVING PUCn NER*
A N ANOMALOUS situation has arisen in Wisconsin with respect
to the workings of the parol evidence rule as result of the law
developed in the warranty and fraud cases decided by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. It appears that upon the same set of facts the sub-
stantive rights of the pleader may vary depending upon the form of
his pleading.
The action on a warranty originally was regarded as an action in
tort for deceit.- No reported decision records an action on a warranty
being brought in assumpsit until 1778.2 Under the Sales Act "any
affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods
is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation is
to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases
the goods relying thereon." 3 Warranties, however, of quality are not
limited under the decision of our Supreme Court to the sale of goods,
but may attach to the sale of land,4 or of a chose in action.5 Whether
an action on a warranty may sound in tort as well as contract, is at
least doubtful under the decisions of our Supreme Court.6
To recover in Wisconsin in an action in tort for deceit the buyer
must allege and prove (1) a representation of a fact by the seller
relating to the thing sold, (2) the representation is untrue, (3) the
buyer acted in reliance upon the representation, (4) the buyer suffered
damage as the result of so relying.7 It is not necessary to allege either
an intent to deceive, or that the statement of fact was made in reckless
indifference to the truth. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
IAmes History of Assumpsit; 2 .Harv. L. Rev. 1.8.
2 Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Dougl. 18.
3 Section 121.12 Wis. Stats.
4 Green v. Batson, 71 Wis. .54.
5 Giffert v. West, 33 Wis. 617.
6 White v. Hale, 47 Wis. 424;
Cameron v. Mount, 86 Wis. 477;
Rood v. Taft, 94 Wis..380;
Klipstein v. Raschein, 117 Wis. 248.
7 Helberg v. Hosmer, 143 Wis. 620;
Bank of Evansville v. Kurth, 167 Wis. 43;
Jones v. Brandt, 173 Wis. 539.
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in an action in tort for misrepresentation the one who makes the false
representation of fact to induce another to enter into a contract
whereby injury to the latter results because of such falsity, is liable
for damages caused by his conduct, regardless of whether he knew, or
in the exercise of ordinary care, might have known, the truth of the
matter." So also it is not required that the buyer in an action in tort for
deceit prove that the representations are made with the expectation
that the buyer shall rely on them.9
To recover in an action in contract on an express warranty, the
buyer must allege and prove (1) a representation of fact or any prom-
ise by the seller relating to the thing sold having a tendency to induce
the sale, (2) talsity of the representation, or breach of the promise,
(3) the buyer acted in buying the thing upon the representation of fact
or promise by the seller, (4) buyer suffered damage.10
From the foregoing it is at once apparent that in the sale of goods,
of real estate or of a chose in action, upon the same set of facts,
namely, (1) misrepresentation of a fact relating to the thing sold,
(2) reliance by the buyer to his damage upon the truth of the fact
misrepresented may be based a cause of action either in contract upon
an express warranty, or in tort for deceit. The allegation and proof
required in both actions are the same."
The representation of fact relating to the thing sold may be either
verbal or written, but where the written bill of sale contains an express
warranty as to some particulars, 2 or where the contract of sale is in
8 Bird v. Kleiner, 41 Wis. 134;
Davis v. Nazum, 72 Wis. 439;
Palmer v. Goldberg, 128 Wis. 103;
Kathan v. Comstock, 140 Wis. 427;
Jones v. Brandt, 173 Wis. 539;
Ohrmundt v. Spiegelhoff, 175 Wis. 214.
9 Helberg v. Hosmer, 143 Wis. 620;
Woteshek v. Neuman, 151 Wis. 365;
Jones v. Brandt, 173 Wis. 539.
20 Section 121.12 Wis. Stats. note: In the case of Smith v. Reed, 141 Wis. 483,
decided under the Sales Act, it was held that "if an express warranty had
been given in express terms as a part of the contract of sale, no proof
of reliance thereon would have been necessary. * * * But where a mere
representation of fact is proved * * * it must be shown to have been
relied on by the vendee in order to constitute a warranty."
1 Helberg v. Hosmer, 143 Wis. 620;
Jones v. Brandt, 173 Wis. 539;
Section 121.12 Wis. Stats.;
Smith v. Reed, 141 Wis. 483.
12Merriam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640;
Boothby v. Scales, 27 Wis. 626;
J. I. Case Plow Works v. Niles & Scott Co., 90 Wis. 590.
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writing,13 parol evidence to show a verbal warranty is inadmissable.
The rule likewise is equally established that fraudulent misrepresen-
tations relied upon by the buyer may be shown by parol as a defense
to an action by the seller for the price, notwithstanding that the con-
tract of sale is in writing.1 4 Applying this rule of evidence to the
requirements of pleading and proof in the Wisconsin fraud cases, the
question instantly occurs where the action is brought in tort for deceit,
-the allegations being simply (1) misrepresentation of a fact relating
to the thing sold, (2) reliance by the buyer to his damage upon the
truth of the representation made,--and the contract of sale is in writing
whether or not the Wisconsin Supreme Court will sanction parol proof
of the misrepresentation when on identical facts, had the action been in
contract on a warranty, no parol evidence to vary the written contract
of sale would have been admissable3' The writer can find in the Wis-
consin Reports only two cases in which the foregoing problem has been
before the Wisconsin Supreme Court.' 6 The case of Jones vs. Brandt,
173 Wis. 539 was an action in which the assignees of the sellers
brought a suit on notes given for the price of a dredge. The buyers
of the dredge, who were made defendants, impleaded the seller com-
pany and served a cross-complaint upon it. The plaintiffs were held
not to be holders in due course. For the purpose of this article the issue
raised by the cross-complaint alone is important and will be considered
solely.
The contract of sale in the case was in writing, and among other
things contained a guaranty of good materials, workmanship and
capacity, and provided expressly that the entire understanding between
the parties was embodied therein. At the trial of the case evidence of
oral representations made before and at the time of the sale was re-
ceived over the objections of the seller. The jury, by a special verdict,
found, (1) the seller made certain representations of fact relating to
the dredge which were not contained in the written agreement, (2) the
representations were false, (3) the buyer relied upon the representa-
tions. No finding was made that the seller knew that the representa-
tions were false, that the representations were made in reckless indif-
13 Fox v. Boldt, 172 Wis. 333;
Wis. Livestock Assn. v. Bowerman, 198 Wis. 447.
14 Jones v. Brandt, 173 Wis. 539;
Wulfers v. Clark Motor Co., 177 Wis. 497;
Creasey Corp. v. Dunning, 182 Wis. 388;
Sherlock v. Bradley Poly. Inst., 184 Wis. 425.
15 Fox v. Boldt, 172 Wis. 333;
Wis. Livestock Assn. v. Bowerman, 198 Wis. 447.
16 Jones v. Brandt, 173 Wis. 539;
Bank of Evansville v. Kurth, 167 Wis. 43.
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ference to the truth, or that the seller in the exercise of ordinary care
ought to have known that the representations were false. The findings
made would sustain a judgment for breach of warranty equally well
as one for fraud." The admission of the testimony as to the represen-
tations made at the time of the sale of the dredge was assigned by the
seller as error. The court held that it was the well settled rule of the
state that it was competent to show by parol that a contract was entered
into relying on fraudulent representations, citing among other cases
Bank of Evansville v Kurth, which in its facts is clearly in point.
The apparent import of Jones vs Brandt and Bank of Evansville
v Kurth is that despite the existence of a written contract of sale
verbal misrepresentations not made either knowingly, in reckless dis-
regard of the truth, or without the exercise of ordinary care to ascer-
tain the truth, may be proved by parol if such facts are made the
basis of an action in tort for deceit. The result is the anomalous situa-
tion that on the same set of facts in one instance, if pleaded in. an
action in tort for deceit, parol representations may be proved, in an-
other instance, if pleaded in a contract action for breach of warranty,
the parol representations may not be received in evidence.,
There is no doubt genuine disagreement as to the soundness of
the policy behind the parol evidence rule and to the extent a court
should follow it. To some Jones vs. Brandt may be heralded as a
definite step forward toward a total abrogation of the rule. The
language of the decision does not clearly express on the part of the
court an appreciation of the step it was taking, and of the authorities
it cites not all are in point.19 The impression from Jones vs. Brandt
"7Section 121.12 Wis. Stats.;
Smith v. Reed, 141 Wis. 483;
Helberg v. Hosmer, 143 Wis. 620;
Bank of Evansville v. Kurth, 167 Wis. 43;
Jones v. Brandt, 173 Wis. 539.
Is Merriam v. Field, 24 Wis. 640;
Boothby v. Scales, 27 Wis. 626;
J. I. Case Plow Works v. Niles & Scott Co., 90 Wis. 590;
Fox v. Boldt, 172 Wis. 333;
Wis. Livestock Assn. v. Bowerman, 198 Wis. 447;
Jones v. Brandt, 173 Wis. 539;
Wulfers v. Clark Motor Co., 177 Wis. 497;
Creasey Corp. v. Dunning, 182 Wis. 388;
Sherlock v. Bradley Poly. Inst., 184 Wis. 425;
Wis. Livestock Assn. v. Bomermon, 198 Wis. 447.
19 Bank of Evansville v. Kurth, 167 Wis. 43;
Hannon v. Kelley, 156 Wis. 509;
Hurlbert v. Kellogg L. & M. Co., 115 Wis. 225;
Gross v. Drager, 66 vVis. 150.
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and the other Wisconsin fraud and warranty cases, is that the anomal-
ous situation herein referred to is the result of having lost sight of
the historical developments of the common law actions of warranty
and deceit. Originally, as has been pointed out, an action on a war-
ranty was in tort.2 0 Later it could be brought in assumpsit,2 1 and the
prevailing view today is that an action on a warranty may be brought
either in tort or contract.22 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not
clearly recognized that fact.23 As the action of warranty developed
it became unnecessary to prove a scienter24 and in most jurisdictions,
an intent,25 and the majority rule has been codified in the Sales Act. 26
Most jurisdictions, however, have held that to sustain an action
in tort for deceit the misrepresentation must be made either know-
ingly or in reckless disregard of the truth. 7 Under the Wisconsin
cases a mere misrepresentation of a fact relating to the thing sold,
if relied on by the buyer to his damage, constitutes fraud.28 In the
writer's opinion it is going a long way to put the badge of fraud on
a person who misrepresents facts neither wilfully nor in reckless
disregard of the truth, and it should not make any difference under
the code whether the action is in equity or in law.29 In neither case
ought the court hold out an innocent misrepresentation as fraudulent.
It would seem to be better law to create a distinction between war-
ranties and fraudulent misrepresentation, so as to include in the latter
classification only misrepresentations of fact that are made either
knowingly or in reckless indifference to the truth. It would seem
also to be good law not to permit a contracting party to escape the
penalty of his wilful or reckless misrepresentation by setting up a
20 Ames History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 1.8.
21 Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Dougl. 18.
22 Williston on Sales (2nd. ed.) Par. 197 and cases cited in note 35.
23 Pierce v. Carey, 37 Wis. 232;
White v. Hale, 47 Wis. 424;
Cameron v. Mount, 86 Wis. 447;
Rood v. Taft, 94 Wis. 380;
Klipstein v. Raschein, 117 Wis. 248.
24 Williston on Sales (2nd ed.) Par. 196.
25 Williston on Sales (2nd ed.) Par. 201.
20 Section 121.12 Wis. Stats.
2726 C. J. 1123 (Par. 49) et sequitur;
12 R. C. L. 239 (Par. 10).
2s Helberg v. Hosmer, 143 Wis. 620;
Woteshek v. Neuman, 151 Wis. 365;
Bank of Evansville v. Kurth, 167 Wis. 43;
Jones -. Brandt, 173 Wis. 539.
29 Miner v. Medbury, 6 Wis. 294.
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written contract of sale. With respect to warranties the same rule
of evidence ought to apply whether the action is in tort or in contract
on the warranty. No attempt is made here to present a case for or
against the parol evidence rule; but the form of the motion, the
writer feels, where there is no difference in the facts, should not,
as is apparently now the case in Wisconsin, govern the substantive
right of the pleader.
